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2Contract Enforcement and Argentina’s Long-Run Decline
Argentina has slipped from being among the ten richest countries in the world by the
eve of World War I to its current position close to developing countries. Why did
Argentina fall behind? In this paper we employ a structural model to investigate the
extent to which contract enforcement, as captured by Clague, Keefer, Knack, and
Olson’s “Contract Intensive Money”, conditioned broad capital accumulation and
economic growth in Argentina and, consequently, the country’s relative
international position. Our results suggest that poor contract enforcement played a
major role in Argentina’s unique experience of long-run economic decline.
How has Argentina, a country which occupied a position among the ten richest countries
in the world in terms of income per capita in the period 1880-1929, slipped to its current place in
the ranking, closer to that of Turkey than to Western Europe’s?
Argentina began to lose ground compared with Australia and Canada, countries whose
development was also largely due to the exploitation of natural resources and the exports of
staple goods, in the late nineteenth century1. That is, before the dates (the First World War, the
Great Depression and the post-World War II era) with which, up to now, economic historians
signaled the beginning of Argentina’s retardation2. However, it was not until the second half of
the twentieth century, and in particular during its last quarter, when she fell behind definitively3.
Why was Argentina not able to catch up with Australia and Canada during the twentieth century?
Why did Argentine drop back? are questions that still await a definitive answer.
Investment, as a means of rising capital intensity, is, according to the neo-classical
explanation of growth, the way to increase output per person. However, the increase in both
3human and physical capital depends, ultimately, on the existence of a set of incentives provided
by institutions4. In this paper we investigate the extent to which poor contract enforcement
conditioned broad capital accumulation and economic growth in Argentina and, consequently, the
country’s relative decline.
How to measure the connections between institutions, ‘a construct of the human mind’,
and investment and growth represents a major challenge5. Christopher Clague, Philip Keefer,
Stephen Knack, and Mancur Olson suggested a way of measuring compliance with contracts and
the security of property rights, which they define as “contract intensive money” [henceforth,
CIM] and is equal to the percentage of deposits in the money supply (M2)6. The idea behind this
indicator is that the way financial assets are held depends on the definition of property rights.
When economic agents think they are operating in a stable context, in which property rights are
well defined and guaranteed, it is not risky to keep assets in deposit accounts and, consequently,
cash becomes a less attractive option. Therefore the proportion of deposits in the money supply
will tend to increase. Better contract enforcement will encourage investment and, hence, lead to a
higher rate of growth. The opposite situation would be caused by a poorly defined institutional
framework.
In the paper we observe that the CIM measure is closely associated to economic freedom,
political stability, and financial development, and can be interpreted as an indicator of contract
enforcement7 . The long-run association between contract enforcement, as measured by CIM,
broad capital accumulation and growth in Argentina is investigated with a system of structural
equations. Our results suggest that poor contract enforcement played a major role in Argentina’s
unique historical experience of economic decline.
In the rest of the article we survey interpretations of the origins of Argentina’s
comparative retardation (section 2), examine quantifiable institutional indicators and find that
CIM is positively associated with them and can be represented as a measure of contract
4enforcement (section 3). Later, we investigate the determinants of growth using a structural
model which includes CIM (section 4). To conclude we explore the counterfactual scenario of
how different Argentina’s growth would have been if, in terms of contract enforcement, she had
been closer to Australia and Canada (section 5).
When and why did Argentina begin to decline?
Argentina, Australia and Canada are often compared as they are all considered areas of
new settlement, countries which became exporters of primary goods under British influence and
followed similar paths between the end of the nineteenth century and the mid-twentieth century.
These large, scarcely populated countries were blessed with supplies of natural resources which
gave them a privileged international position despite the fact that they were geographically
distant from the centers of economic activity8.
Graph 1 presents Argentina’s performance relative to Australia and Canada, in terms of
product per person (expressed as its difference in natural logarithms). We have used purchasing
power parity adjusted GDP per capita expressed in 1913 US relative prices for the period 1875-
1939, and 1980 US relative prices for the period 1940-20019. The levels of real product per
person for 1913 and 1980 are taken from Leandro Prados de la Escosura10. The volume indices
used to project these benchmarks back and forth over for the whole period are taken from Angus
Maddison, except for the period 1875-1935 in Argentina, for which we used Roberto Cortés
Conde’s GDP reconstruction11. Argentina caught up rapidly with Australia and Canada until the
late nineteenth century when Argentina’s relative position began to stagnate and the decline set in
(although occasionally drawing level with Canada until the 1930s). A significant, negative
structural break took place in 1974 after which Argentina fell further and further behind12.
Why was Argentina not able to maintain its relative position to Australia and Canada?
What was the cause of Argentina’s progressive decline? are recurrent questions which historians
and economists have been trying to answer for some time.
5The origins of Argentina’s falling behind have been the object of much attention and
battery of mostly untested explanations has been proposed. The definitive closing of the frontier
was, according to Guido Di Tella and Manuel Zymelman, the main difference between Argentina
and the other areas of new settlement as no adequate alternatives to compensate for the end of
geographical expansion were found13 . Christopher Platt and Guido Di Tella pointed to the
political tradition and immigration origins as the key differential factors, while Carlos Díaz
Alejandro suggested that a restrictive immigration policy, similar to Australia’s, by encouraging
the relative scarcity of labor would have increased productivity14. Institutions have been blamed
for Argentina’s falling behind. Tim Duncan and John Fogarty argued that the contrast between
the stable, flexible government of Australia and the bad government of Argentina is the crucial
difference15. In Carl Solberg’s influential view, while the policy of land distribution led to a large
number of small farmers in Canada, in Argentina resulted in a small number of landowners with
large plots of land with the consequence of higher wealth inequality16 . Moreover, the erosion of
the rule of law since the 1930s is at the roots of Argentina’s slide from the Core into the
Periphery17.
Demography also seems to have had a part in Argentine’s falling behind. Alan Taylor
pointed that the relatively high dependency rate and the slow demographic transition in Argentina
led to lower savings rates than in Australia and Canada18. If Argentina’s dependency rate had
been similar to the average of those of Australia and Canada, her savings rate would have
doubled. Much of the capital entering the country would do so as a reaction to such low savings
rates19. Argentina depended on foreign capital, so the First World War and the subsequent ‘de-
globalization’ reduced the capital inflow and had a negative impact on both capital formation and
economic growth, giving rise to the beginning of her historical retardation20.
Industrialization policy seems to matter for Argentina’s differential performance in the
Interwar years. In Argentina, an import substitution industrialization (ISI) strategy was in sharp
6contrast with the export led growth strategy favored by Canada. From the thirties onwards,
capital accumulation was hampered by the relatively high prices of (mostly imported) capital
goods, which was the result of an industrial policy of import substitution21. Multiple exchange
rates, a black market for foreign currencies, the depreciation of the national currency and high
customs tariffs were the underlying distorting factors behind the high relative prices of capital
goods22. The resultant lower capital intensity, in turn, would explain the lower rates of labor
productivity achieved by Argentina in comparison with Australia and Canada.
Property rights of land that promoted inequality, the erosion of rule of law, a high
demographic burden, permissive immigration policy, and ISI strategy, appear among the main
explanatory hypotheses of Argentine’s falling behind. We will make an effort to quantifying the
institutional framework in which they developed and exploring the relationship between
institutions, broad capital accumulation, and economic growth.
Measuring institutions
In an attempt to define the institutional framework and measure its influence, Clague et al.
proposed an indicator known as ‘Contract Intensive Money’ (CIM) which represents the money
kept in deposits as a proportion of the money supply:
CIM = (M2-C)/M2 (I)
Where C is currency outside banks and M2 is the money supply including current and term
deposits23.
The rationale that lies beneath this indicator is that when economic agents trust that
contracts will be respected and do operate in an environment considered to be safe, they hold a
larger proportion of their money as deposits, so the CIM indicator tends to increase. CIM
measures the proportion of transactions that rely on third-party enforcement and, hence, provides
an indicator of the security of property rights24. If contracts are enforced, a favorable atmosphere
for investment is created. In this environment the rate of capital formation will tend to rise,
7leading to economic growth. It follows that there should be a positive association between CIM,
the investment rate and growth25.
Another institutional dimension to be considered is economic freedom. High public
spending, import substitution, hyperinflation, and large gaps between the official and the market
exchange rates are restrictions to economic liberty that have occasionally featured Argentine
economic history. In order to take them into account we have constructed a ‘Reduced’ Index of
Economic Freedom [henceforth RIEF]26. The components of RIEF are, public consumption (Gi)
as a proportion of total consumption (that is, private consumption, Ci, plus Gi) (Gi/(Gi+Ci)), the
‘depreciation in the real value of money’ (inflation rate/100+inflation rate), weighted nominal
protection (tariff), and the difference (in logs) between the official exchange rate and the market
rate (‘black market’). To compute RIEF we have used factorial analysis, based on the principal
components method, and the results appear in Table 1. The variables appear in the first
component with positive weightings, which indicates that they are inversely related with
economic freedom, so we had to multiply the value of each variable by -1 to obtain the
components’ values in the ‘reduced’ index. RIEF was calculated as a linear combination of these
four variables, with the shares of the values obtained by factorial analysis for each component as
a proportion of their total value as their respective weightings27.
There are other institutional aspects that can be approached indirectly through quantitative
indicators. Such are the cases of institutional instability, the degree of democratization, income
distribution, or financial development. Institutional stability is a very elusive variable and we
have proxied it by the length of tenure of Supreme Court justices (Iaryczower, Spiller and
Tommasi 2002) [Supreme, hereafter]. As for the democracy indicator we resorted to Polity IV, in
particular, the political index, Polity228. Financial development has been also pointed as a crucial
institutional dimension of growth and we approximated by the ratio of money supply (M2) to
GDP [Depth, thereafter]29. Lastly, we explored the connection between income inequality and
8growth. Income inequality has been associated to growth: either negatively, if it is linked to
social instability which, in turn, would impinge on investment and, hence, on growth, or
positively, if it is associated to the higher savings propensity of those at the top of the income
distribution30. Lack of quantitative historical evidence from which constructing income
distribution measures led Jeffrey Williamson to propose an ‘inequality index’ defined as the ratio
between GDP per worker and unskilled wage [INEQ, thereafter] that has been adopted here31.
The rationale for the index is that while the numerator captures returns to all factors of production
per worked hour, the denominator only encapsulates returns for raw labor, whose property is far
more widespread than that of any other factor32 .
Is there a long-term relationship between CIM, and economic freedom, institutional
stability, income distribution, and financial development? (Graphs 2-7). To provide an answer we
have carried out an exhaustive analysis of the cointegration between CIM and each of these
variables individually considered. The conventional approach assumes that cointegration vectors
are time-invariant. However, there is the possibility of a general type of cointegration, where the
cointegrating vector is allowed to change at an unknown single break during the sample period33.
A structural brake would be reflected by a change either in the intercept, in the slope, or in the
regime in which the variables are relating to each other.
The results, presented in the Appendix, provide empirical support for the presence of
cointegration. The variables which represent economic freedom (RIEF), financial development
(DEPTH), institutional stability (Supreme) and income inequality (INEQ) are individually
cointegrated with CIM in a Gregrory-Hansen sense34. In particular, different models report that
cointegration between CIM and RIEF, DEPTH, and Supreme is present with a break point in
1960, 1946, and 1942, respectively.
The fact that a cointegration relationship has been found means that each of these
variables has a common trend with CIM and, hence, a stable short-run relationship can be
9established which leads us to develop a Granger causality test between CIM and the rest of the
variables. The results presented in the Appendix suggest that RIEF, DEPTH, Supreme, and INEQ
are individually ‘causing’ CIM. Thus, we can conclude that CIM may be consider as a variable
that summarizes, and is caused by, variables such as economic freedom, institutional stability,
income distribution, and financial development.
In order to explore the kind of association established between CIM and the rest of
variables we can now proceed with a cointegration analysis to test the existence of a long run
relationship between CIM, as the dependent variable, and RIEF, DEPTH, Supreme and INEQ as
the explanatory variables so CIM is modeled as an endogenous variable.
Instead of using extensions of the Gregory-Hansen method for the case of multiple breaks,
which would induce us to search for the breaks in an endogenous way again (see Bai and Perron
1998) we have accepted the breaks founded in the previous analysis of the individual relationship
between CIM and its explanatory variables35. Nevertheless, we have chosen the combination of
breaks that reports the best adjustment in the model based on the F-statistic and on the AIC
selection criteria.
The results shown in Table 3 confirm the existence of a cointegration relationship
between this set of variables which are the fundamental determinants of CIM’s long-run
behavior. Furthermore, the sign of this correlation changes from mid-twentieth century onwards
as the cointegration shifted to a new long-run relationship. A change of regime occurred since
1960 in the long-run relationship between RIEF and CIM and, henceforth, RIEF exhibited a
slightly negative relationship with CIM. Thus, a 10 percent increase in RIEF would raise CIM by
0.9 percent before 1960 while, thereafter, a similar increase would reduce CIM by 0.2 percent. A
similar finding is found from 1942 onwards for the long run relationship between CIM and
Supreme. It can be shown, then, that a 10 percent increase in Supreme rises CIM by 0.6 percent
up to 1942, while reduces it by 0.2 percent thereafter. A positive association is found between
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both DEPTH and INEQ, and CIM. Thus, a 10 percent rise in DEPTH would increase CIM by 1.3
percent, while a similar increase in INEQ leads to a 0.8 percent increment in CIM. Since 1960 the
financial development, DEPTH, and income distribution, INEQ, variables became the main
determinants of the positive trend observed in CIM up to the end of the twentieth century,
offsetting the decline in economic freedom, RIEF, and in institutional stability, Supreme36. Why
income inequality is positively associated to contract enforcement poses a most challenging
question. Is it because since natural resources were the abundant factor in Argentina, openness,
associated to growth, is in a Stolper-Samuelson way, also associated to inequality?37 .
Together with this long-run association we can also derive a short-run relationship, that is,
the error correction model associated to the cointegration relationship. The results shown in Table
4 are quite eloquent and confirm the idea that the variation in CIM is influenced by deviation (in
the previous period) from long-run equilibrium, represented by the parameter et-1.
Moreover, in the short-run, CIM depends on the contemporary and past variations in
RIEF, DEPTH, Supreme, and INEQ. More specifically, the variation of CIM in a particular year
would be higher, the larger the change in economic freedom (RIEF) (two years before), in the
level of democracy (Polity2), and in financial development (DEPTH). Additionally, an increase
in income inequality (INEQ), leads to a rise in CIM. Conversely, an increase in both Supreme and
the separation of powers variable (Separation) (two years before) leads to a reduction in the
variation of CIM, which reflects institutional stability38.
Trends in CIM
Graph 2 offers the evolution of CIM in Argentina between 1863 and 2000, while Graph 8
presents its behavior relative to Australia and Canada.
A mildly rising trend in CIM took place during the late nineteenth century and the early
twentieth century. This was an era of high political stability and formal democratic institutions
that concealed authoritarian Governmental practices (Graph 3). Male universal suffrage had been
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effective since 1853 but was severely constrained by the requirement of Argentinean citizenship
at a time of massive immigration. Electoral fraud and lack of political competition showed in the
low electoral turnout39 . Political stability and the protection of property rights favored,
nonetheless, economic progress. CIM expansion was interrupted by cyclical drops, the longest
one during the Baring crisis. The Baring crisis evidenced the conflict between a high fiscal
deficit, the impossibility of maintaining a constant exchange rate and a poorly regulated banking
system40. The lack of co-ordination between monetary policy and fiscal policy appear as the
factor which, in the final analysis, caused the crisis and led to the collapse of the banking
system41. This situation seems to have led to a marked decrease in CIM.
The turn of the century signaled the beginning of a period of economic recovery and
political stability which lasted until the First World War while the expansion of CIM peaked in
1921. In fact, the highest CIM levels are to be found in the Interwar years. Such a favorable
evolution of CIM coincides with the period in which Argentina enjoyed a transition to an open
democracy with an independent judiciary and a clear separation of powers (Alston and Gallo
2006) that is delimited between 1912, when compulsory universal vote for men over 18 years and
secret ballot was introduced (Colomer 2004), and the 1930 coup d’etat. Economic policies
maintained orthodoxy until the 1930s crisis. Free trade policy continued virtually unaltered42.
Moreover, between 1890 and 1929 Argentina was anchored to the currency board with the Caja
de Conversión having as its principal mission to guarantee the currency’s value abroad43.
CIM decreased in the years following 1934, although its value remained high for another
decade. This deterioration occurred at the time the foundations of independent judiciary (that is,
that justices’ preferences show in their decisions without facing Government’s retaliation) were
eroded as the 1930 coup d’etat was condoned by the Supreme Court and followed by electoral
fraud which paved the way for populism and for a departure from a democratic system with
checks and balances44. This decline in CIM might be also associated with changes in
12
macroeconomic policy. The public sector implemented a policy of balance budget after the
Depression, which required new sources of income and reductions in spending45. The change in
trade policy would also play its part46 . Exchange controls were introduced and the peso was
significantly devalued more than once after the devaluation of the pound in 1931. Quantitative
restrictions were also introduced at this time47. Inward-looking policies laid the foundations of
corporatist policies and populism48.
Perón’s arrival to power in 1946 and his consecutive terms of office coincide with a fall of
CIM to levels similar to those of the last decade of the nineteenth century. The electoral fraud of
the 1930s which led to a popular disbelief in the rule of law, has been argued, help explain Juan
Domingo Perón’s landslide victory in the first experience of male and female universal suffrage
in Argentina49. The impeachment of the Supreme Court, as it represented an obstacle to populist
policies, and the introduction of the 1949 Constitution destroyed the separation of powers and
implied that property rights were no longer maintained through the rule of law (Graph 4).
Early Peronism was a period of macroeconomic shocks during which a strategy of import
substitution industrialization was put into practice. Bilateral trade, exchange control and multiple
exchange rates were its most important characteristics50. The increase in the role of government
reflected in the increase in state-owned property, interventionism (including control of rents and
prices) and higher levels of public spending, mainly financed by the inflationary tax51. The
expansive macroeconomic policy, which aimed at the redistribution of wealth and the increase of
spending to finance populist policies, led to inflation. Argentina’s inability to return to the rule of
law translated into political and economic volatility (high inflation, drastic devaluations) during
the decades that follow Perón’s arrival to power52. Instability and lack of economic freedom
impinged on CIM53.
CIM did not start its recovery until the late 1960s and it was only in the late 1970s that
levels of the early 1930s were regained. The sixties saw a policy change which included an
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attempt to face the challenges of inflation, public deficit and foreign debt, as well opening up the
economy54 . Perón’s second term of office was characterized by an expansive monetary policy,
which resulted in an uncontrolled rise in the level of inflation55 . Faced by hyperinflation and
negative real interest rates, the financial reform of 1977 only achieved short-lived success, which
was interrupted by the 1980 crisis56. This situation was made worse by the flight of capital, large
fiscal and external deficits and, especially, by an enormous foreign debt which would reach
record levels in 1982, the year of The Falklands’ War57. Attempts to control the hyperinflation
and carry out fiscal reform in 1983 and the following years resulted in another failure. This
situation corresponds with a slump of CIM that would only recover over the 1990s when the
Menem government brought the hyperinflation under control, established a fixed rate of
exchange and introduced deregulation.
The evolution of Argentina’s CIM relative to Australia’s and Canada’s provide support
for our findings and point to the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, to the post-World
War II era (the so called ‘Golden Age’), and the late 1980s and early 1990s as the phases in
which the gap between Argentina and the two other regions of new settlement deepened (Graph
8).
CIM and economic growth in Argentina
To what extent did contract enforcement influence Argentina’s long-run performance? To
provide a response we use a structural growth model based on a system of simultaneous
equations designed to avoid problems of endogeneity.
Our starting point is a conventional equation in which the level of real product per head is
dependent on GDP per capita in the previous period, on the rate of change of the economically
active population [EAP] (as an indicator of the growth of labor), on the average enrolment rate in
primary and secondary education (to represent the growth of human capital), on the average rate
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of investment (as an approximate measure of the growth of physical capital) and, finally, on the
rate of variation of the exports ratio to GDP (to indicate how openness changed over time)58.
In additional equations we have attempted to endogenize each explanatory variable. For
example, the investment rate, one of our main variables, is considered as endogenous in Equation
2 and its behavior is specified as dependent on the real interest rate, the relative price of capital
goods, per capita GDP growth (lagged one period), the variation in the dependency rate and,
finally, on CIM. Moreover, we investigate how much does CIM impinge on other variables
which are considered endogenous too, such as the EAP variation, education enrollment, and the
change in openness.
In the estimation we have employed the seemingly unrelated regression method (SUR)
that solves the problem of contemporary correlation between the equations’ residuals. The
average values of the variables and their standard deviations are shown in Table 2. The
econometric results are presented in Table 5. All variables have the expected sign and level of
significance. The level of real GDP per head is directly and significantly related to investment
and schooling rates and also (though not significantly) to the rate of variation of the EAP. A
standard deviation increase in the rate of investment would represent, two periods later, a rise of
1.7 percent in per capita GDP; the same increase in the rate of primary and secondary enrolment,
six periods later, would rise per capita GDP by 3.8 percent. From these results we can say that
investment in a broad sense, in physical and in human capital, is the main force behind the
evolution of the GDP per head in Argentina. Lastly, an increase of standard deviation in the rate
of variation of openness would induce a rise of 1.2 percent in the level of income per capita.
It is worth highlighting that the explanatory variables of the level of per capita GDP are
influenced by CIM. For example, from Equation 2 we can conclude that the lower the real
interest rate and the relative price of investment goods (in terms of consumer goods), the higher
the proportion of GDP dedicated to capital formation in a previous period, while the larger the
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increase in CIM, the higher the investment rate. In other words, if the real interest rate and the
relative price of capital goods decrease by one standard deviation, the rate of investment would
rise by 3.3 and 5.8 percent, respectively59 . In turn, one standard deviation increase in the level of
CIM five periods earlier would raise the rate of investment by 2.6 percent. Thus, the
improvement in contract enforcement, captured by CIM levels, appears as a one of the major
determinant of capital formation in Argentina.
Moreover, these results lend support to the view that attributes the low capital
accumulation to a high dependency rate in the ‘age of mass migration’ and to high relative prices
of capital goods since the central decades of the twentieth century60. A standard deviation
increase in the variation of the dependency rate means a decrease in the rate of investment of
about 2.4 percent. Additionally, the level of education enrollment, one of the main variables
affecting the level of the GDP per head, would increase of about 1.3 percent as a consequence of
an increase of a standard deviation in CIM. It also is worth mentioning that the more open the
economy and the more developed its financial system, the lower the price of capital goods.
All in all, the results of the estimated system of equations suggest that, in Argentina,
contract enforcement and the security of property rights, as measured by CIM, would lead to
higher rates of human and physical capital accumulation and, thus, to a higher level of per capita
GDP.
Concluding Remarks: A Counterfactual Proposition
In this paper we have analyzed the causes of Argentina’s long-run decline using a
structural model which incorporates contract enforcement in the form of the CIM indicator. Our
results show that poor contract enforcement and lack of security of property rights hindered
investment in broad capital and, consequently, economic growth.
A comparison of CIM levels with those of Australia and Canada suggests that, economic
agents had less confidence in the compliance of contracts in Argentina (Graph 8). In fact, the
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average value of CIM for Argentina is 0.70 over 1863-2001, compared with an average of 0.90
and 0.84 for Australia and Canada, respectively. This lower value corresponds with an average
lower share of investment in GDP, 15.1 percent for Argentina, compared with 20.8 for Australia
and 19.4 percent for Canada (computed for 1885-1998, 1861-2001 and 1870-2001, respectively).
What would have happened if property rights had been better defined and contracts better
enforced in Argentina? Would Argentina have caught up with Australia and Canada in terms of
material welfare? To provide an answer, we propose a counterfactual exercise which illustrates
the contribution of an improvement in CIM to investment and, indirectly, to growth: What would
have been the effects on rate of investment and education enrollment and, indirectly, on per
capita GDP if Argentina’s CIM would have been equivalent to the average of Australia’s and
Canada’s?
The result of this counterfactual exercise indicates that, ceteris paribus, a higher CIM
would have led to a higher rate of physical and human capital accumulation especially in those
periods for which Argentina’s deviation from Australia and Canada is larger: 1882-1911, 1946-
1972, and 1988-1998 (Table 6). In particular, a higher CIM would have increased substantially
the investment rate during the second half of the twentieth century. The simultaneous rise of the
enrollment and investment rates would increase the pace of economic growth and, thus, reducing
the per capita GDP gap with Australia and Canada (Table 7).
Actually, had Argentina reached a CIM similar to the average of Australia’s and
Canada’s, she would have kept pace with Australia until 1960 (Graph 9a), and though her decline
with respect to Canada would have began in 1940, a substantial deterioration would have not
occurred until the 1960s (Graph 9b).
Thus, the case that Argentina’s long-run decline has deep institutional roots is supported
by the evidence provided here. Better contract enforcement and definition of property rights
would have allowed Argentina to keep pace with Australia and Canada until the second half of
17
the twentieth century. Why her position deteriorated from the 1960s onwards deserves, however,
another quantitative and comparative exploration.
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APPENDIX
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
What does CIM depend on? In order to provide a formal answer we have carried out a
cointegration analysis between CIM and the variables representing economic freedom (RIEF), -a
variable constructed through the Principal Component analysis- and financial development
(DEPTH) -defined as the percentage of the monetary supply over the GDP. The objective is to
find a stable relationship in the long run between CIM and each of these variables which will
permit us to test for causality, that is, the direction in which those variables are effecting each
other.
To do so and due to the fact that all these variables are integrated of order one (I(1)), as
can be seen in Table A.1, we are able to contrast the null hypothesis that there is not a
cointegration relation between CIM and each of these two variables61 .
We start with the cointegration analysis between CIM and RIEF. The Augmented
Dickey-Fuller test (ADF) applied to the residuals from the cointegration relation shown below
does not permit us to reject the null hypothesis because the value obtained is smaller than the
critical value at 1% significance (-2.129 and –4.040 respectively)
LCIMt= -11.098 + 0.005*T + 0.142*RIEFt+et
(-8.169) (7.981) (6.304)
where the symbol L represents the variables in logarithms, and T is a time-trend variable.
Nevertheless, this result can be due to the existence of a break in the cointegration
relation between both variables62. If the model is indeed cointegrated with a one-time regime
shift in the cointegrating vector, the standard ADF test may not reject the null hypothesis and one
could wrongly conclude that there is not long-run relationship. If this is our case, we should be
able to find, in a endogenous way, the break which exhibits the minimum value, -the maximum
value in absolute terms-, in an ADF test applied to the residuals from the cointegration relation
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which contains this particular break. We have to treat the timing of this shift as unknown The
structural change would be reflected in changes in the intercept and/or in the slope.
LCIMt= -14.291 + 0.007*T + 0.291*RIEFt – 0.246*DU60 – 0.325*(DU60*RIEFt) + et
(-14.228) (13.881) (13.535) (-6.847) (-11.545)
Where DU60 is a dummy variable that represents a change in the level of the
relationship after 1960 and (DU60*RIEF) represents a change in the regime for the
relationship between CIM and RIEF after 1960, and (*) means rejection at 1%
significance.
ADF: Model C: -6,136*
Model C/T –6,112*
Model (none) –6,162*
In fact, that break is founded in 1960 which indicates that a structural change exists in the
cointegration relation represented by a change in the level and by a change of regime in the
cointegration relationship between CIM and RIEF after that date. Moreover, that break permit us
to reject the null hypothesis at 1% of significance what lead us to the conclusion that there exist a
cointegration relation in the long run between these variables with a break in 1960.
Moreover, using the residuals from the estimation of the long-run equilibrium
relationship and considering this break, we can estimate the error correcting model what allows
us to carry out the causality analysis relating to CIM and RIEF.
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The Wald test applied to contrast the hypothesis that sustains lcim=12 (i)= 0 permits us
to reject the idea that all coefficients are zero and, hence, we can conclude that RIEF Granger
cause CIM.
Wald test (1) Ho: lcim =12 (i)= 0
F-stat.= 7.270 (3.96)
Chi-sq.= 29.081 (12.84)
Nevertheless, the Wald test applied to the second equation (equation (2)) indicates that
RIEF=0 and all 22(i)=0. From this result we conclude that CIM does not Granger cause RIEF.
Wald test (2) Ho:RIEF =22(i)=0.
F-stat.= 3.783 (3.96)
Chi-sq.= 11.350 (12.84)
What happens with the long-run relationship between CIM and DEPTH? Which variable
causes which? Appling a similar approach we did before for CIM and RIEF, we can confirm the
idea that there exits a long-run relationship between both variables and that the causality runs
from DEPTH to CIM, that is, DEPTH Granger-causes CIM. The results of our analysis are
shown below:
Long run relationship between CIM and DEPTH:
LCIMt= -5.464 + 0.003*T + 0.153*LDEPTHt+et
(-6.488) (6.068) (3.776)
However, and as it was the case in the analysis of the relationship between CIM and
RIEF, we are not able to reject the null hypothesis that sustains that there is not a cointegration
relation (the value from the ADF test is of –1.552 respect to a critical value of -4,040 at 1%
significance). So, we apply the Gregory-Hansen method to obtain the following results:
LCIMt= -13.769 + 0.007*T + 0.087*LDEPTHt – 0.44*DU46 + et
(-15.205) (14.825) (3.083) (-11.869)
Where DU46 is a dummy variable that represents a change in the level of the relationship after
1946.
ADF: Model C: -3.750*
Model C/T –3.735*
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Model (none) –3.767*
Finally, we can prove that the results from the causality test are effectively indicating that
DEPTH Granger-causes CIM as it can be seen below:
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Wald test (1) Ho:lcim =12 (i)= 0
F-stat.= 5.036 (3.96)
Chi-sq.= 15.108 (12.84)
Wald test (2) Ho:ldepth =22 (i)= 0
F-stat.= 0.349 (3.96)
Chi-sq.= 1.014 (12.84)
And proceeding in the same way for SUPREME and for INEQ (Inequallity), we have obtained:
LCIMt= -11.947 + 0.0058*T +1.881*LSUPREMEt – 0.163*(DU42*LSUPREMEt) + et
(-16.916) (16.283) (12.283) (-10.378)
Where DU42 is a dummy variable that represents a change in the level of regime in the
cointegration relationship after 1942.
ADF: Model C: -4.604*
Model C/T –4.585*
Model (none) –4.623*
Finally, we can prove that the results from the causality test are effectively indicating that
SUPREME Granger-causes CIM and INEQ as it can seen below :
)2(
,sup2
123.0
2
*085.0
1
*249.0
3
*956.0
2
285,0
1
*564.3
1
466.0
)1(
,3
*006.0
2
*005.0
1
*003,0
3
*069.0
2
115,0
1
*024.0
1
019,0
tremelt
LSUPREME
t
LSUPREME
t
LSUPREME
t
LCIM
t
LCIM
t
LCIM
t
e
t
LSUPREME
tlcimt
LSUPREME
t
LSUPREME
t
LSUPREME
t
LCIM
t
LCIM
t
LCIM
t
e
t
LCIM
































Wald test (1) Ho:lcim =12 (i)= 0
F-stat.= 4.130 (3.96)
Chi-sq.= 16.522 (12.84)
Wald test (2) Ho:lsupreme =22 (i)= 0
F-stat.= 1.964 (3.96)
Chi-sq.= 7.856 (12.84)
And the causality test for CIM and INEQ:
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Wald test (1) Ho:lcim =12 (i)= 0
F-stat.= 4.583 (3.96)
Chi-sq.= 13.750 (12.84)
Wald test (2) Ho:lineq =22 (i)= 0
F-stat.= 0.743 (3.96)
Chi-sq.= 2.230 (12.84)
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Table A1. Cointegration Order of the Variables Considered in the Model.
LEVELS First Difference LEVELS First Difference
Variable
(logs)
K* ADF
(C)
ADF
(C/T)
ADF
(None)
ADF
(C)
ADF
(C/T)
ADF
(None)
P-
Perron
( C)
P-
Perron
(C/T)
P-
Perron
(None)
P-
Perron
( C)
P-
Perron
(C/T)
P-
Perron
(None)
Order of
Integration
Per Capita
GDP
1 -2.656
***
-3.334
***
2.601 -12.54 -12.73 -11.905 -2.728
***
-2.993 2.781 -12.646 -13.116 -11.892 I(1)
EAP 1 -3.464
**
-1.390 5.214 -7.360 -8.282 -3.968 -3.539
*
-1.255 6.609 -8.119 -8.650 -3.904 I(1)
Investment 1 -2.376 -3.392
**
-0.862 -9.519 -9.472 -9.549 -1.775 -2.993 -0.673 -9.858 -9.783 -9.882 I(1)
Enrolment 1 -1.776 -2.103. -3.496
*
-13.37 -13.46 -12.64 -1.866 -2.174 -4.159
*
-13.840 -14.297 -12.545 I(1)
Variation in
Openness
0 -1.994 -2.192 -0.283 -11.25 -11.23 -11.30 -1.806 -2.091 -0.096 -11.756 -11.814 -11.804 I(1)
Interest Rate 3 -2.036 -2.078 -1.177 -7.649 -7.703 -7.681 -6.191 -6.108 -2.452 -13.195 -13.233 -13.270 I(1)
Depreciation 2 -1.911 -2.070 -1.583 -9.376 -9.379 -9.427 -2.444 -2.357 -2.185 -9.360 -9.363 -9.410 I(1)
CIM 0 -1.872 -2.290 -1.262 -12.71 -12.56 -12.689 -1.985 -2.543 -1.225 -12.876 -12.853 -12.761 I(1)
DEPTH 3 -1.857 -2.061 -0.125 -7.938 -7.922 -7.953 -1.712 -2.194 -0.205 -8.815 -8.770 -8.862 I(1)
RIEF 2 -0.981 -2.357 -0.889 -9.453 -9.406 -9.416 -0.856 -3.104 -0.809 -13.826 -13.750 -13.579 I(1)
Supreme 1 -3.225
**
-3.215 -1.263 -7.374 -7.380 -7.402 I(1)
INEQ 3 -0.298 -1.268 1.061 -8.010 -8.103 -7.906 -0.226 -1.390 2.179 -13.651 -14.253 -12.848 I(1)
* significant at 1%;
** significant at 5%;
*** significant at 10%
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Sources
Argentina
‘Black Market’ (official-market exchange rate deviation, in logs), 1913-1984, IEERAL,
“Estadísticas”; since 1985, Vázquez-Presedo, Estadísticas Históricas.
Consumption, Total and Government (ratio to GDP), Della Paolera et al., “Historical Statistics”.
Contract Intensive Money (CIM) [(M2-C)/M2], 1863-91, Cortés Conde, “Fiscal Crisis”; 1892-
1948, Della Paolera et al., “Historical Statistics”; since 1948, IMF, Financial Statistics. Adjusted
to IMF levels of M2 and C (currency in circulation).
Dependency Rate, (percentage of population below 15 and above 64 over population ages 15
to 64), 1875-1900, Mitchell, Historical Statistics; since 1900, Astorga et al., “Latin
American Database.”
‘Depreciation in the Real Value of Money’ (inflation rate/(100+inflation rate), Della Paolera et
al., “Historical Statistics”.
Economically Active Population, 1875-1900, Mitchell, Historical Statistics; since 1900, Astorga
et al., “Latin American Database.”
‘Financial Depth’ (ratio of money supply, M2 to GDP), M2 as for CIM; GDP at current prices,
Della Paolera et al., “Historical Statistics”.
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), at current prices, Della Paolera et al., “Historical Statistics”; at
constant prices, 1875-1935, Cortés Conde, economía argentina; since 1935, Maddison, World
Economy.
Interest Rate (1875-93, returns to public bonds; 1913-33, banking discount rate), 1875-1930:
Della Paolera, “Experimentos”; 1930-1950, Della Paolera y Ortiz, “Dinero”; 1950-1973, Vitelli,
lógicas; since 1973, IMF, Financial Statistics . Real interest rate obtained by adjusting the
nominal interest rate by inflation.
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INEQ, Real Income Inequality (ratio of real GDP per EAP to real wage rates), Real GDP and
EAP from the sources quoted above. Real wages from Williamson, “Global Markets’, and ILO,
Statistical Yearbooks.
Investment Rate (investment ratio to GDP), Della Paolera et al., “Historical Statistics”.
‘Openness’ (exports ratio to GDP), Della Paolera et al., “Historical Statistics”; since 1985,
Vázquez-Presedo, Estadísticas Históricas.
Population, 1875-1900, Mitchell, Historical Statistics; since 1900, Astorga et al., “Latin
American Database.”
Polity2, this index ranges from high autocracy (-10) to high democracy (+10), Marshall and
Jaggers, Polity IV Project.
Primary and Secondary Enrolment (proportion of population ages 5-18 in primary and secondary
school), Mitchell, Historical Statistics; since 1900, Astorga et al., “Latin American Database.”
‘Reduced’ Index of Economic Freedom’ (RIEF), is an index whose components are public
consumption (Gi) as a proportion of total consumption (Gi/(Gi+Ci)), the ‘depreciation in the real
value of money’ (inflation rate/100+inflation rate), weighted nominal protection (tariff), and the
difference (in logs) between the official exchange rate and the market rate (‘black market’). The
index is derived through the principal components method.
Relative Price of Capital Goods (the investment deflator ratio to the consumption deflator, in
logs), Della Paolera et al., “Historical Statistics”.
Separation of Powers, a dummy variable that takes value 1 when there is separation between
legislative, executive, and judicial powers, and 0 otherwise, computed from Alston and Gallo,
“Rule of Law”, Figure IV.
Supreme Court Justices’ Length of Tenure, number of years, kindly supplied by Pablo Spiller.
‘Tariff’ (Nominal weighted tariff, i.e., ratio of tariff revenues to imports’ values), Della Paolera et
al., “Historical Statistics”; since 1985, Vázquez-Presedo, Estadísticas Históricas.
26
Terms of Trade (ratio of export price to import price), Williamson (private communication),
1870-1913; Della Paolera et al., “Historical Statistics”, 1913-84, since 1984, IMF, Financial
Statistics.
Australia
Contract Intensive Money (CIM) [(M2-C)/M2], 1863-1948, Vamplew, Australians; since 1948,
IMF, Financial Statistics. Adjusted to IMF levels of M2 and C (currency in circulation).
Investment rate (investment ratio to GDP), Vamplew (1987); since 1970, OECD, National
Accounts.
Canada
Contract Intensive Money (CIM) [(M2-C)/M2], 1863-1948, Statistics Canada, Historical
Statistics; since 1948, IMF, Financial Statistics. Adjusted to IMF levels of M2 and C (currency in
circulation).
Investment rate (investment ratio to GDP), 1870-1926, Urquhart, “New Estimates”; 1926-1970,
Statistics Canada, Historical Statistics; since 1970, OECD, National Accounts.
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Table 1.
Principal Components Analysis to Construct the ‘Reduced’ Index of Economic Freedom (RIEF)
Public Consumption/Total Consumption Real Depreciation of Money Weighted Nominal Protection ‘Black market’
Factor 1 0.959 0.883 0.549 0.381
Factor 2 0.040 0.030 -0.694 0.830
Sources: See text and Appendix.
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Table 2.
Variables in the Models: Average and Standard Deviation
Variables Average
(Standard
Deviation)
Per head GDP level
Per Capita GDP Growth
Initial GDP per capita (in logs)
Economically Active Population Growth
Primary and Secondary Enrolment(in logs)
Investment Rate (in logs)
Real Interest Rate
Dependency Rate (Rate of Variation)
Relative Price of Capital Goods (in logs)
CIM (in logs)
RIEF
Openness (Rate of Variation)
Financial Depth (M2/GDP) (in logs)
Terms of Trade Rate of Variation
Supreme Court Justices’ length of tenure
(logs)
INEQ (Inequality) (logs)
8.322
(0.544)
0.013
(0.072)
8.431
(0.410)
0.022
(0.019)
-0.835
(0.457)
-1.976
(0.441)
0.061
(0.052)
0.022
(0.037)
-0.259
(0.246)
-0.337
(0.141)
-0.108
(1.045)
-0.003
(0.151)
-1.101
(0.378)
0.011
(0.106)
1.556
(0.690)
-0.160
(0.295)
Sources: Appendix
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Table 3.
Long-Run Relationship
Dependent: LCIM Parameters
Constant
Time
RIEF
LDEPTH
LSUPREME
LINEQ
DU50
(DU60*RIEF)
(DU42*LSUPREME)
R2-Adj=0.846
AIC=-5.709
F=80.471
Nº Obs.=116
-13.185
(-15.055)
0.006
(14.814)
0.091
(3.799)
0.129
(5.128)
0.062
(4.289)
0.084
(2.733)
-0.165
(-5.824)
-0.113
(-4.391)
-0.086
(-7.456)
Note: t ratios in brackets.
L represents the variable expressed in logarithms.
DU50, is a dummy variable that represents a change in the level of the long-run relationship after
1950, and DU60 and DU42 are dummies variables that represent a change in the relationship of
RIEF and SUPREME with CIM, after 1960 and 1942 respectively.
Test ADF over the residuals of the model
Modelo C: -6.245*
Modelo C/T –6.221*
Modelo (none) –6.272*
Test redundant variables (RIEF/LDEPTH):
Ho: the coefficients of the two variables are jointly zero:
F= 103.04 (critical value=4.79)
Log LR= 122.44 (critical value=10.60)
Test de White:
Ho: errors are homoscedastic and independents
White test= 12.73 (critical value=16.7)
RESERT test:
Ho: linear functional form
F= 0.241 (0.63)
Log LR= 0.256
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Table 4
Error Correction Model
Dependent: DCIM
et-1
DRIEF(-2)
DDEPTH
DDEPTH(-1)
DSUPREME
DSUPREME(-2)
DLINEQ
POLITY2
SEPARATION(-2)
R2-Adj.= 0.509
AIC= -6.917
F-st.= 15.544
DW= 1.987
Nº Obs.=113
-0.234
(-4.184)
0.023
(1.978)
0.203
(8.974)
-0.093
(-4.028)
-0.015
(-2.259)
0.013
(1.937)
0.098
(3.759)
-0.001
(-1.815)
0.010
(2.385)
Note: D represents the variables in differences and et-1 is the lagged error term of the
cointegration equation from Table 4 and is the variable that represents the adjustment in the long-
run.
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Table 5. Econometric Model: Structural Estimation (SUR) (t ratios in brackets)
Dependent Variable Per Capita
GDP
Investment
Rate
EAP
Growth
Enrollment
Rate
Openness Rate
of Variation
Relative Price
of Capital
CIM Financial
Depth
Constant -3.691
(-2.982)
-13.574
(-16.400)
Trend 0.001
(3.837)
-0.0002
(-3.446)
-0.0001
(-2.129)
0.001
(2.218)
-0.0002
(-4.198)
-6.75E -0.5
(-2.417)
0.007
(16.137)
-78.93E-0.5
(-3.227)
Initial Per Capita GDP(-1) 0.754
(11.892)
0.025
(2.284)
0.089
(2.609)
EAP Growth (-1) 0.157
(0.415)
0.108
(1.232)
EAP Growth (-2) -0.838
(-1.214)
1.204
(1.997)
Investment Rate (-1) 0.835
(19.872)
Dependency Rate of
Variation (-6)
-0.641
(-1.944)
Investment Rate (-2) 0.040
(1.708)
Enrollment Rate (-1) -0.034
(-4.154)
0.793
(16.568)
0.057
(1.434)
Enrollment Rate (-6) 0.083
(2.959)
Openness Rate of
Variation
0.082
(1.057)
Per Capita GDP growth(-
1)
0.978
(5.521)
Per Capita GDP growth (-
2)
0.224
(1.311)
-0.264
(-3.239)
Interest Rate (-1) -0.644
(-2.190)
-0.368
(-1.796)
Relative Price of Capital -0.235
(-2.555)
Relative Price of Capital
(-1)
-0.437
(-4.148)
0.860
(18.387)
DU45 0.215
(3.974)
CIM (-1) 0.096
(2.040)
CIM (-2) 0.202
(2.122)
CIM (-5) 0.187
(1.903)
0.037
(3.144)
Per Capita GDP growth 0.225
(1.566)
Openness (-1) 0.716
(11.699)
-0.064
(-2.377)
Terms of Trade Variation 0.143
(3.297)
RIEF 0.090
(4.011)
DU50 -0.176
(-6.603)
DU60*RIEF -0.112
(-4.609)
RIEF(-1) 0.065
(2.995)
Financial Depth 0.121
(5.118)
Financial Depth (-1) 0.802
(17.747)
Financial Depth Variation -0.146
(-3.301)
SUPREME 0.064
(4.700)
INEQ 0.074
(2.574)
(DU42*SUPREME) -0.088
(-8.198)
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R2-Adj.
Nº Observations= 125
Total System Obs.= 932
0.97 0.90 0.21 0.98 0.90 0.92 0.84 0.89
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Table 6.
Simulation: Actual and Counterfactual Values (%)
Investment Rate Enrollment Rate
Actual Counterfactual Actual Counterfactual
1882-1911 13.2 13.3 20.4 25.1
1946-1972 18.5 40.4 52.4 62.3
1988-1998 17.8 30.6 88.3 95.6
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Table 7.
Argentina’s Relative Per Capita GDP: Actual and Counterfactual Values (%)
Australia = 100 Canada = 100
Actual Counterfactual Actual Counterfactual
1882-1911 70.7 74.7 92.3 97.4
1946-1972 73.0 85.0 70.2 81.7
1988-1998 48.4 57.2 45.0 52.9
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Graph 1. Argentina’s Relative GDP per Head. 1875-2001 (differences in logs)
(U.S. Relative Prices) [$ 1913. 1875-1939; $ 1980. 1940-2001]
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Graph 2. The Evolution of CIM in Argentina. 1863-2003
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Graph 3. CIM and Polity2, 1863-2003
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Graph 4. CIM and Supreme Court Justices’ Length of Tenure, 1863-2003
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Graph 5. CIM and the Real Inequality Index, 1863-2003
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Graph 6. The Evolution of CIM and RIEF. 1884-2003
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Graph 7. The Evolution of CIM and M2/GDP. 1884-2000
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Graph 8. Argentina’s Relative CIM. 1863-2002 (differences in logs)
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Graph 9a.
Actual and Counterfactual Argentina’s Per Capita GDP Relative to Australia, 1875-2000
(differences in logs)
(U.S. Relative Prices) [$ 1913. 1875-1939; $ 1980. 1940-2001]
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Graph 9b.
Actual and Counterfactual Argentina’s Per Capita GDP Relative to Canada, 1875-2000
(differences in logs)
(U.S. Relative Prices) [$ 1913. 1875-1939; $ 1980. 1940-2001]
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1 These results are from the study of the relative series of GDP per capita between 1875 and 1990 using the unit root
method and structural breaks. Cf. Sanz-Villarroya, “tendencias a largo plazo”, and “Convergence”.
2 Cf. Cortés Conde, economía argentina; Di Tella and Zymelman, etapas; Díaz Alejandro, Essays; Ferrer, economía
argentina; Taylor, “External Dependence”, “Tres fases”, and “Inward-Looking Development”.
3 See Sanz-Villarroya, “Convergence”; and Kydland and Zarazaga, “Lost Decade”.
4 North, Institutions, p. 134.
5 As North, Institutions, p. 107 writes, “We cannot see, feel, touch, or even measure institutions; they are constructs
of the human mind” . Cf. Knack and Keefer, “Institutions”, for an attempt to prove this relationship empirically.
6 Clague, Keefer, Knack, and Olson, “Contract Intensive Money”.
7 It should be kept in mind, however, that stable institutions can be impediments for growth when under their rule risk
taking is constrained and property rights are not enforced (Bueno de Mesquita and Root, “Bad Economics”, p. 7).
8 See Gallo, Pampa gringa; Duncan and Fogarty, Australia and Argentina; Platt and Di Tella, Political Economy.
9 This procedure attempts to mitigate the index number problem caused by using real product per capita series
expressed in relative prices of a distant benchmark year. This is the case with Maddison’s World Economy figures in
1990 dollars, which are normally used in this type of comparison. Nevertheless, the use of Maddison’s data does not
significantly change the results (Sanz-Villarroya, “Convergence”).
10 Prados de la Escosura, “International Comparisons”.
11 Maddison, World Economy; Cortés Conde, economía argentina.
12 Sanz-Villarroya, “Convergence”.
13 Di Tella and Zymelman, etapas.
14 Platt and Di Tella, Argentina, Australia, and Canada; Díaz Alejandro, “Argentina, Australia, and Brazil”. On the
different migration policies applied in the ‘areas of new settlement’ cf. Timmer and Williamson, “Immigration
Policy”. They suggest, however, that Argentina introduced a restrictive immigration policy in the early twentieth
century. Such a view is rejected by Sánchez-Alonso, “Argentina’s Immigration Policies”.
15 Duncan and Fogarty, Australia and Argentina.
16 Solberg, Prairies and Pampas. However, an open land market existed in Argentina where many more immigrants
than generally believed became farmers (Sánchez-Alonso, “Those Who Left”). Gallo, Pampa gringa, argued that
lack of capital and agricultural knowledge made advantageous for immigrants to become tenant farmers. Cf.
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Adelman, Frontier Development, for a qualified assessment of Solberg’s views. Also, Ferns, Gallo and Watkins,
“Review”.
17 Alston and Gallo, “Checks and Balances”.
18 Taylor, “External Dependence”.
19 Taylor and Williamson, “Capital Flows”.
20 In fact, between 1900 and 1929, Argentina’s savings rate was around 10 percent lower than that of Australia and
Canada and her dependency rate was 5 percent higher (Taylor, “External Dependence, pp. 922-5). Taylor estimated
that, in the long term, around two thirds of the difference between the savings rates in Argentina and Australia was
due to the disparity in their dependency rates.
21 Taylor, “Tres fases” and “World Capital Market”.
22 Taylor, “Inward-Looking Development”; Collins and Williamson, “Capital Goods Prices”.
23 Clague et al. “Contract Intensive Money”.
24 Clague et al. “Contract Intensive Money”, p. 204, use factorial analysis to show that a group of institutional
indicators which includes measures of political and civil freedom, the degree of property rights’ definition, and of the
frequency of revolutions and coups d’état, has a heavier load in factor 1, while financial development variables
appear in factor 2. They, hence, conclude that CIM is mainly a measure of property rights enforcement. Cf. Sylla and
Rousseau, “Financial Systems”, for the long-run connections between financial development and growth.
25 CIM would weaken as a measure of institutional quality if it were just a measure of savings, so the higher the
interest rate, the larger the proportion of the money supply in deposits, and it would not be surprising to find an
association between CIM and the rate of investment. We found, however, that CIM is a good predictor of the
different components of capital formation that do not necessarily have a high correlation with savings rates and,
hence, rejected this scenario for the case of Argentina. To do so, we run regressions for Equation 2 of Table 6 with
farm investment, non-farm investment and government investment instead of total investment rates and the results
were highly coincidental with positive and statistically significant associations between CIM and each component of
total investment. Data for investment components comes from Della Paolera et al. , “Historical Statistics”.
26 This index of economic freedom is reduced in the sense that it does not include other quantitative variables (and
none of the qualitative variables) that are considered in the Fraser Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom, cf.
Gwartney and Lawson, “Economic Freedom” for a definition and justification of the variables included in the Fraser
index.
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27 These weightings are: 0.346 for Gi/(Gi+Ci), 0.318 for Inflation/(100+Inflation), 0.198 for Tariff and 0.137 for
‘black market’.
28 The Polity2 index ranges from high autocracy (-10) to high democracy (+10) and it is part of Policy IV database.
Cf. Marshall and Jaggers, Polity IV Project.
29 Cf. Sylla and Rousseau, “financial Systems”.
30 Cf. Barro, “Inequality and Growth”; Kaldor, “Theories of Distribution”; Alesina and Perotti, “Income
Distribution”; Persson and Tabellini, “Inequality”.
31 Williamson, “Land, Labor, and Globalization”.
32 An exploration about long-run income inequality in Latin America is carried out in Prados de la Escosura,
“Inequality and Poverty”.
33 Gregory and Hansen, “Cointegration”.
34 Gregory and Hansen, “Cointegration”.
35 See Bai and Perron, “Linear Models”.
36 The battery of tests applied to the long-run relationship between CIM, RIEF, and DEPTH indicates that the
determinants of CIM are not redundant as both RIEF and DEPTH have their own particular explanatory power. We
are not able to reject the hypothesis that sustains that the errors in the model are homocedastic and independent.
Hence, we do not have heteroscedasticity problems and the RESERT test shows that there is no linearity in the
parameters and, thus, the linear specification we have proposed appears to be correct.
37 Could it be argued that Argentina represents the scenario in which individual savings rates rise with per capita
income and, hence, a rise in income inequality increases investment and, thus, growth?. As Barro, “Inequality and
Growth”, p. 8, points, this hypothesis implies a relatively closed economy to the extent the investment rate is closely
related to the savings rate, as it seems to have been the Argentinean case.
38 Separation is a dummy variable that takes value 1 when there is separation between legislative, executive, and
judicial powers and has been computed from Alston and Gallo, “Rule of Law”, Figure IV.
39 Colomer, “Taming the Tiger”.
40 Della Paolera and Taylor, Straining.
41 According to Della Paolera and Taylor, Straining, p. 11, the crisis showed initially the symptoms of a traditional
banking crisis, that is an increase in the amount of cash in the hands of the public, an increase in the banks’ reserves-
deposits ratio and the elimination of some financial institutions, which meant the destruction of deposits.
56
42 According to O’Connell, “Free Trade”, p. 91, there were few changes in trade policy, while the rest of the world
returned to protectionism. During the 1920s Argentina continued its free trade policy as a producer of staple goods.
The main change was a tariff increase in 1923 from 25 to 60 percent of the official ‘aforo’ values. Cf. Di Tella,
“Economic Controversies”, pp. 122-23.
43 The return to the gold standard took place in 1899 and, despite leaving it again in 1900, 1914 and 1929, the
monetary authorities continued to act within its rules (Della Paolera and Taylor, “Economic Recovery”).
44 Iaryczower, Spiller, and Tommasi, “Judicial Independence”; Alston and Gallo, “Checks and Balances”. Alston and
Gallo emphasize the gap between the Conservatives’ good economic policies and political short-sightedness during
the 1930s.
45 According to Della Paolera and Taylor, “Economic Recovery”, the effects of the fiscal decisions taken could have
led to contraction until 1935 and it cannot be said that a New Deal type policy was practiced.
46 For Di Tella, the 1930 crisis was the watershed between free trade and protection in Argentina, although the main
change came after the Second World War (Di Tella, “Economic Controversies”, p. 128.
47 Alhadeff, “Economic Controversies”, p. 104.
48 Berensztein and Spector, “Business”, p. 363.
49 Alston and Gallo, “Checks and Balances”; Colomer, “Taming the Tiger”.
50 Rock, Argentina .
51 Di Tella and Dornbusch, Political Economy.
52 Alston and Gallo, “Checks and Balances”.
53 Institutional instability reveals itself in the shortening of length of Supreme Court justices’ tenure (Iaryczower,
Spiller, and Tommasi, “Judicial Independence”).
54 There were attempts to create an atmosphere which was favorable to private capital by the adoption of measures to
stabilize and liberalize the economy under Frondizi’s presidency and following an agreement with the IMF.
Exchange rates were unified and many controls, both internal and external, were lifted. Under the Onganía
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